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NOTES AND COMMENTS
where only the betting on the horses was illegal.1 6 Some of the statutes
under this class provide that so much. of any building or structure as
may be entered through the same outside entrance shall be closed.1 7 The
North Carolina statute and several others provide that the place en-
joined shall include any building, erection, or place or any separate part
or portion thereof, or the ground itself.1 8 In none of these statutes of
the second class is the' deprivation of the use of the property absolute.
For the owner may apply to the court for permission to reopen, and if it
is satisfied with his good faith he may reopen his business by posting a
bond conditioned that he will immediately abate the nuisance and pre-
vent its repetition for a period of one year.
Most of the acts specified in the above statutes were nuisances at
common law. But equity has been hesitant to enjoin nuisances where
the conduct was also a crime. Hence the legislatures have acted to re-
assure equity courts of their jurisdiction and to encourage them with a
more extensive weapon.
The court in the principal case reached its decision under its general
equity powers, and not by statutory provision. It is probable that the
extensive scope of statutory injunctions influenced the court in going
that far.
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
Fraudulent Conveyances--Dower Where the Conveyance Is Set
Aside-Interests of the Parties.
Plaintiff's husband, eleven months before their marriage, conveyed
real estate to his mother in fraud of his creditors. Whereupon a cred-
itor brought an action to set aside the conveyance, and caused notice
of lis pendens to be filed. Plaintiff thereafter married the debtor, and
subsequently a judgment was rendered setting aside the conveyance as
to the creditor. After her husband's death the plaintiff claims dower
in this land against the defendants, the purchasers (and their vendees),
under a sale pursuant to the judgment in the action to which the wife
was not a party. Held, fraudulent conveyances are valid as between
the parties, and the plaintiff's husband was never beneficially seized
during coverture so that dower would attach.'
It is a generally accepted rule that an absolute conveyance of prop-
erty in fraud of creditors is good as against all the world, except the
" Pompono Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927).
CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. (Deering, 1931) Act 6161, §1; COLO. STAT. ANN.
(Michie, 1935) Vol. 2 c. 1 §1.
" ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §9280; DEL. REV. CoD. (1935) §5272;
D. C. CoDE (1930) tit. 6, §184; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3180.
'McLawhorn v. Smith, 211 N. C. 513, 191 S. E. 35 (1937).
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defrauded creditors.2 The fraudulent grantee has a superior equity as
against the grantor, and, where the conveyance has been impeached by
the creditors, is entitled to any surplus remaining after satisfaction of
the creditors' claims.8 Where the wife has joined in the conveyance so
impeached her right of dower is usually held to revive, irrespective of
her knowledge of her husband's intent.4 Other jurisdictions distinguish
between the wife's knowledge and lack of knowledge of the husband's
intent, and allow her dower to revive only in the latter instance.6 The
revival is based on the theory that since the inchoate dower right can-
not -be sold or released except to one having an interest in the land,0 and
since the grantee has been deprived of his interest for the benefit of the
grantor's creditors, the release must fail.7 Nor can the creditors set up
the release to bar the wife's dower, because the release operates by way
of estoppel and binds the wife only so far as the parties to the release
and their privies are concerned." Dower in the entire quantity of land
is restored to the wife or widow "just as if no such deed had been
'Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50, 10 Sup. Ct. 13, 33 L. ed. 242 (1889) ; Back-
house v. Jett, .2 Fed. Cas. No. 710 (C. C. D. Va. 1821); Atwater v. Seeley, 2
Fed. 133 (C. C. D. Minn. 1880) ; The Inhabitants of Canton v. The Inhabitants
of Dorchester, 8 Cush. 525 (Mass. 1851) ; Coltraine v. Causey, 38 N. C. 246
(1844) ; Ellington v. Currie, 40 N. C. 21 (1847) ; York v. Merritt, 80 N. C. 285
(1879) ; Saunders v. Lee, 101 N. C. 3, 7 S. E. 590 (1888) ; Pierce v. Stallings, 163
N. C. 107, 79 S. E. 302 (1913); Marshall v. Dicks, 175 N. C. 38, 94 S. E. 514
(1918) ; Mosely v. Mosely, 15 N. Y. 334 (1857).
a Abbey v. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 55 P. (2d) 903 (1936) ; Crowin-
shield v. Kittridge, 7 Met. 520 (Mass. 1944); Wheeler v. Wallace, 53 Mich. 364,
19 N. W. 37 (1884) ; Maze v. Griffin,,6 Mo. App, 377 (1896) ; Tetrault v. Ingra-
ham, 54 Mont. 524, 171 Pac. 1148 (1918). Accord: Sturges v. Portis Mining Co.,
206 Fed. 534 (E. D. N. C. 1913); see Charles v. White, 214 Mo. 187, 190, 112
S. W. 545, 548, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 481 (1908). But see Ballard v. Jones, 6
Humph. 455, 458 (Tenn. 1846).
"Robinson v. Bates, 3 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1841) ; Summers v. Babb, 13 Ill. 483
(1851); Lowry v. Fisher, 2 Bush 70 (Ky. 1867); Malloney v. Horan, 49 N. Y.
111 (1872) ; In re Lingafelter, 181 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910) ; Wilson v. Rob-
inson, 83 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Cox v. Wilder, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3308
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1872); Wyman v. Fox, 59 Me. 100 (1871); Ridgway v. Mast-
ings, 23 Ohio St. 294 (1872); Munger v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499, 22 N. W. 511
(1885); Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105 Misc. 15, 173 N. Y. Supp. 870 (1918); EX
parte Clark, 125 S. C. 34, 118 S. E. 27 (1923) ; Elliott v, Locklear, 185 Ark. 269,
46 S. W. (2d) 1105 (1932). Contra: Den, Ex Dem. Stewart v. Johnson, 18 N. J.
L. 87 (1840); Dey v. Allen, 77 N. J. Eq. 522, 78 AtI. 674 (1910); Barhan v.
Bogard, 128 Ore. 218, 270 Pac. 762 (1928).
Kitts v. Wilson, 130 Ind. 492, 29 N. E. 401 (1891); Wells v. Estes, 154 Mo.
291, 55 S. W. 255 (1900) ; Bradshaw v. Halpin, 180 Mo. 666, 79 S. W. 685 (1904).
1 Lampetes Case, 10 Co. 46 (1613); Saltmarsh v. Smith, 32 Ala. 404 (1858);
Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 Ill. 289 (1868) ; McCormick v. Hunter, 50 Ind.
186 (1875); Harriman v. Gray, 49 Me. 537 (1860); Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md.
47 (1880); Mason v. Mason, 140 Mass. 63; 3 N. E. 19 (1885); TIFFANY, Our-
LINES OF REAL PROPERTY (1929) §163.
"Lockett's adm'x v. James, adm'r, 8 Bush 28 (Ky. 1871); Wyman v. Fox, 59
Me. 100 (1871); Bohannon v. Combs, 97 Mo. 446, 11 S. W. 232 (1889); Munger
v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499, 22 N. W. 511 (1885).
8Robinson v. Bates, 3 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1841); Lowry v. Fisher, 2 Bush 70
(Ky. 1867) ; Essey v. Bushakra, 299 Mo. 147, 252 S. W. 459 (1923) (creditor with
quitclaim deed from grantee not allowed to prevail over dower).
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executed" or "as if the property had been deeded back to her hus-
band."10
But the above stated general rule declared the grantee to be entitled
against all but creditors. Where there is a surplus after satisfaction
of creditors' claims, the deed is effective to convey that much to him.
As to that portion, would he not have an estate to support the release
of inchoate dower by the wife? But an allotment of dower in the whole
of the premises substantially reduces the amount of the grantee's sur-
plus, or precludes the possibility of there being any surplus. Thus,
under the rules as stated: (1) that the fraudulent grantee is entitled
against all but creditors, and (2) that the wife's dower revives in the
whole property when the transer is set aside, the rights given the widow
and the grantee are conflicting and overlapping. Where his right and
the widow's overlap, she is given preference. It cannot validly be
said, then, that the fraudulent grantee is entitled against all but creditors.
The conveyance is set aside not only as to creditors' claims 'but also to
allow the widow her dower. In effect, the revesting of the estate in the
grantor so that dower may re-attach is made the basis of predication
of dower, rather than the inefficacy of the release of the inchoate
dower. Indeed, such a basis is the only one that is legally tenable.
Under the facts of the principal case, where the conveyance was
made before the marriage, would it not follow that the revesting of the
estate in the grantor to meet creditors' claims would be sufficient to allow
his wife's dower to attach, especially since she personally did not par-
ticipate in the fraud? Only two courts have previously passed directly
on the point, and they held to the contrary."1 They reasoned as does the
court in the principal case-that the grantor is not seized to his own use
during coverture. Nor was he seized to his own use when the estate
was revested in him at the instance of creditors where the conveyance
was made after marriage. Yet, as was pointed out, that revesting was
the only justification for the restoration of dower in all of the property.
Why should it not serve the same purpose here where the wife was not
a party to the fraud?
Still, despite the fact that its reasoning (based on the fallacy in the
stated rules in cases where the conveyance was made after marriage) is
unsound, the principal case reaches the correct result. Here, as is
usually the case, the creditor's claim absorbed all of the proceeds of
the sale of the property, and the creditor has an equity prior to that of
the widow. His priority is 'by reason of his equitable lien attaching
See Ex parte Clark, 125 S. C. 34, 37, 118 S. E. 27, 28 (1923).
Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105 Misc. 15, 16, 173 N. Y. Supp. 870, 871 (1918)."Whited v. Mallory, 4 Cush. 138 (Mass. 1849); Gross v. Lange, 70 Mo. 45
(1879). But see Adkins v. Adkins, 52 S. W. 728, 731 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
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as of the date of the institution of the action' 2 (which was before the
marriage) to set aside the transfer.' 3 Thus the creditor's lien attached
before the dower could attach, and a sale to satisfy the prior lien would
effectually bar any dower claim against the defendant purchasers under
such sale. Because of his priority the creditor is entitled to full satis-
faction of his claim out of the proceeds of the sale before other sub-
sequent rights therein are considered. Where, however, the creditors'
claims do not require all of the proceeds, it would seem that the widow
should be entitled to her dower as against the grantee's claim. We have
seen that logically the revesting of the estate in the grantor should be
sufficient to support dower (whether the wife has ever before had dower
in the property or not), and the fraudulent grantee's deed should be
ineffective against rights of the widow and the creditor arising out of
the revesting of title in the grantor. The equity of the widow as against
the grantee is further strengthened by the fact that though her claim is
through her husband's title which is tainted with fraud, she did not
actually participate in the fraud and is not in pari delicto with the
grantee. C. A. GRIFFIN, JR.
Labor Law-State Anti-Injunction Statutes.
Since the advent of the New Deal there has been a rapidly growing
tendency to look upon labor with an increasingly liberal attitude, evi-
denced, in state labor anti-injunction legislation,' by the correction of
the abuses caused by the injunction in labor disputes during the past
fifty years.2 Twenty-three states have enacted such legislation,3 each
'Hancock v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199 (1890); Frank v. Kessler, 30
Ind. 8 (1868) ; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106 (1869) ; Wooten v. Steele, 109 Ala.
563 19 So. 972 (1895). Accord: The Dawson Bank v. Harris, 84 N. C. 206 (1881) ;
Armstrong Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N. C. 149, 116 S. E. 173 (1923) ; cf. Cas-
sady v. Anderson, 53 Tex. 535 (1880) ; Arbuckle Bros. Coffee Co. v. Werner and
Cohen, 77 Tex. 43, 13 S. W. 963 (1890).
' 'Most jurisdictions require that a judgment be obtained against the grantor
as a condition precedent to the suit to set aside the fraudulent conveyance. Allyn
v. Thurston, 53 N. Y. 622 (1873) ; Estes v. Wilcox, 67 N. Y. 264 (1876) ; Whitney
v. Davis, 148 N. Y. 256, 42 N. E. 661 (1896) ; WAITE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND CREDITORS' BILLS (3d ed. 1897) 149.
'No attempt will be made to consider federal anti-injunction legislation.
2 
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) ; Fraenkel, Recent
Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936) 30 ILL. L.
REv. 854.
3 ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4286 CAL GEN. LAWS (Deer-
ing, 1931) act 1605; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, §78; Idaho Sess.
Laws 1933, c. 215; ILL. RE V. STAT. ANN. (Cahill, 1933) c. 22, §58; ILL. STAT. ANN.
(Callaghan, Supp. 1925-31) c. 22, §58; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §40-504;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, §1107; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp.
1936) §4379.7; ME. LAws 1933, c. 261, §1; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, Supp. 1935) c.
574, §67; Mass. Acts 1935, c. 407, §4; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§4260-
4264; MONT. REv. CODE- ANN. (Anderson & MtFarland, 1935) §9242; N. J. CObzt.
STAT. (Supp. 1925-30) §107-131a; N. Y. CimL PRAcrics (Cahill, Supp. 1936)
§876a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; OKLA. STAT. 1931, §10878; ORE. CODE ANN.
